Missouri Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 1 Winter 1989

Article 13

Winter 1989

Residential Picketing: Balancing Freedom of Expression and the
Right to Privacy
Randall M. England

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Randall M. England, Residential Picketing: Balancing Freedom of Expression and the Right to Privacy, 54
MO. L. REV. (1989)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

England: England: Residential Picketing

RESIDENTIAL PICKETING:
BALANCING FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY
Frisby v. Schultz'
"GET WELL CHARLIE-OUR TEAM NEEDS YOU." Such a sign,
complains Justice Stevens in his dissent to Fisby v. Schultz, could not be
carried in front of a residence in Brookfield, Wisconsin, long enough to
communicate its intended message. 2 Frisby v. Schultz involved a facial first
amendment challenge to a city ordinance which prohibited picketing "before
or about any residence .

. .

."

The Frisby Court upheld the validity of

the ordinance. 3 This Note will discuss the tension between freedom of
expression and the right to privacy as balanced in Frisby and the central
role which the Court's narrow construction of the ordinance played.
Appellees Schultz and Braun, opponents of abortion, sought to express
their views by picketing on a public street in front of a doctor's house
who performs abortions. 4 The appellees and others gathered at least six
times to picket the doctor's home for periods of an hour to an hour and
5
a half. The group ranged in size from eleven to more than forty persons.
The police had no occasion to enforce various ordinances involving ob6
struction of streets, loud noises or disorderly conduct.

1. 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
2.

Id. at 2508 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

3. Id. at 2497. The underlying action had attacked the ordinance both on
its face and as applied. Verified Complaint for Injunctive, Declaratory, and other
Relief at 4, Schultz v. Frisby, 619 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Wis. 1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d
1339 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated, 818 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd en banc, 822

F.2d. 642 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988). The Supreme Court only
addressed (and rejected) appellees' facial first amendment challenge. 108 S. Ct. at
2497, 2504. Appellees are currently attempting to litigate the remaining issues in
the lower federal courts. See Schultz v. Frisby, No. 85-C-1018 (E.D. Wis. Dec.
13, 1988) (granting the town's motion for judgment on the pleadings), appeal
pending, No. 89-1098 (7th Cir. docketed Jan. 17, 1989).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2498.
6. Id. The majority opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, was joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Blackmun, Scalia, Kennedy, JJ. Their description of the
protests as "peaceful and orderly" is not in complete accord with the account
given by dissenters, Brennan and Marshall, JJ. The dissent related allegations
including trespassing, blocking entrances, shouting and frightening young children
with accusations
the doctor
a Scholarship
"baby killer."
Id. 1989
at 2507.
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The town board, moved by the resulting complaints, enacted an ordinance which stated: "It is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing
before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the town
of Brookfield." 7 Appellees halted their picketing when confronted with the
threat of arrest and prosecution and filed suit in district court naming city
officials and the Town of Brookfield as defendants.' Appellees contended
that the ordinance violated the first amendment and brought their complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 19839 seeking declaratory as well as preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief.' 0
The district court concluded that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored
to advance the city's legitimate interests." It found the ordinance, which
"completely bans all picketing in residential neighborhoods," to be an
2
improper restraint of protected speech within the context of a public forum.'
The district court granted a preliminary injunction and ordered that it
become permanent within sixty days unless defendants appealed or either
party requested a trial on the merits. 3 The city appealed the court's entry
of the preliminary injunction and requested a trial on the merits. 14 A
Seventh Circuit panel affirmed the district court's order." The court of
appeals then vacated that decision 6 and reheard the case en banc, affirming
the district court's judgment in an equally divided vote. 17 The city again
appealed, this time to the United States Supreme Court, which disregarded
the lack of finality in the district court's order and granted certiorari due
to the substantial importance of the question. 8 The Frisby Court held that

7. Id. at 2498. The language of the ordinance specifically declared that
"the practice of picketing before or about residences or dwellings causes emotional

disturbance and distress to the occupants... [and] has as its objective the harassing
of such occupants." Id. While the ordinance also expresses concern for public
safety due to the obstruction of streets and sidewalks, the Court mentions this
only in passing.
8. Schultz, 619 F. Supp. 792.

9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides, in part, that "[e]very person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance ... of any state . . . subjects or causes to
be subjected, any citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights . . secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress."
10. Schultz, 619 F. Supp. at 793.
11.
12.

Id. at 797.
Id.

13. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2498 (1988).
14. Id.
15. 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated, 818 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1987),
aff'd en banc, 822 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S.Ct. 2495 (1988).
16. 818 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd en banc, 822 F.2d 642 (7th Cir.
1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
17. 822 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S.Ct. 2495 (1988).
18. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2498-99 (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/13
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an ordinance which prohibited picketing "before or about" any residence 19
was not (as narrowly construed) unconstitutional on its face. 20
PICKETnG AS SPEECH

The acceptance of picketing as a means of expression came late in our
history. Only since the 1940 decision of Thornhill v. Alabama2 has the
Supreme Court recognized that freedom of expression must include the

right to picket.22 The "safeguarding" of that right, said the Court, "is

essential to the securing of an informed and educated public opinion with
respect to a matter which is of public concem." 23
While picketing is protectedtoday, it is only in this century that picketing
was even considered lawful. In 1905 a federal court proclaimed:
There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more
than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching.
When men want to converse or persuade, they do not organize a picket
line ....
...No self-respecting man will submit to it. Nor is he compelled to
submit to it.... He need only apply to the courts ... and he will be
given an order to end it.-

The violence and militancy of labor picketers caused the Supreme Court

in American Steel Foundriesv. Tri-City Central Trades Council to conclude
that picketing was inherently unlawful. 25 But despite American Steel's grim
assessment of picketers, the 1921 decision seemed to signal acceptance of

peaceful picketing, even if the Court was not prepared to recognize it by
name. 26 The same year, in Truax v. Corrigan, Justice Taft declared that
in American Steel Foundries "we held . . .that peaceful picketing was a
contradiction in terms .. -27 At the same time, however, the Court in

Truax held it lawful for the union to maintain a representative at each
plant entrance "to announce the strike and peaceably to persuade the

1905).

19.
20.

Id. at 2497.
Id. at 2504.

21.

310 U.S. 88 (1940).

22. Id.at 104.
23. Id.
24. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584-86 (C.C.S.D. Iowa

25. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184, 205 (1921).
26. Id. The Court indicated that the word "picket" itself symbolized a
militant purpose. See also Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 131 Ga.
336, 340, 62 S.E. 236, 238 (1908).

27. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 340 (1921).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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employees and would-be employees to join them in it."' 28 It took a few
more years to remove the militant stigma that clung to the term picket.
By 1937, the Court, in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local
No. 5,29 no longer perceived a problem with the concept of peaceful picketing
and even implied that picketing was a form of speech which, as such,

would be protected by the Constitution.30 Three years later, in Thornhill

v. Alabama,3' the Court invalidated a state statute 2 prohibiting loitering
or picketing near any establishment with the intent of influencing others
from transacting business there.3 3 In holding the statute unconstitutional,
the Thornhill Court rejected the notion that any business should have an
absolute freedom from speech merely because that speech may be detrimental
to its interests:
Every expression of opinion on matters that are important has the potentiality of inducing action in the interests of one rather than another
group in society. But the group in power at any moment may not impose
penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public
interest merely on a showing that others3 may thereby be persuaded to
take action inconsistent with its interests. '
Since Thornhill, the right to picket has remained firmly tied to first
amendment freedoms. It is this first amendment freedom which the Court
in Frisby counterbalanced against the privacy interest of the picketed resident.
THE PRIVACY INTEREST
An individual's privacy finds constitutional protection in more than
one source. First, the Supreme Court has culled the right to privacy from

28. Id. In his dissent to Truax, Justice Brandeis had a different view of
the Court's opinion in American Steel Foundries, saying that the Court had "recently
held that peaceful picketing is not unlawful." Id. at 371 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

For a discussion of the law of picketing in this period, see Tanenhaus, Picketing
as a Tort: The Development of the Law of Picketing from 1880 to 1940, 14 U.
Pr=r. L. REv. 170 (1953).
29. 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
30. Id.at 478. "Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of
speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." Id. The court in Senn upheld
a Wisconsin law authorizing peaceful picketing. Sern, who was not a union member,
operated a small tile contracting business from his home. Union members picketed
his home, followed him to his jobs and picketed at his job sites. Id. at 473-75.
The Court did not find it significant that the picketing had occurred at Senn's
home.
31. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
32. Id. at 106.
33. Id.at 91.
34. Id. at 104.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/13
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the Constitution itself, particularly as it relates to one's home and family
life.35 The other source of the privacy interest, and the source upon which
the Frisby Court bases its decision, stems from the exercise of state police
power. Courts have held that the police power reaches "beyond health,
morals and safety, ... comprehend[ing] the duty, within constitutional
limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of the community." 36
In Frisby, the Court asserted that the "state's interest in protecting the
well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest
order in a free and civilized society." '3 7 It characterized one's home as
unique; the last "retreat to which men and women can repair to escape
the tribulations of their daily pursuits .

. .

."I

It is this view of one's

home, as the individual's last refuge, which changes the balance between
freedom of speech and the resident's privacy. Within his home the "un-

willing listener" truly becomes a "captive" audience.3" "That we are often
'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home," said the Frisby Court, "and
subject to objectionable speech ... does not mean we must be captives
everywhere." 4 In the conflict between speech and residential privacy, speech
has often been limited. The Frisby Court echoed earlier decisions that
individuals need not submit to unwanted speech in their homes and that
42
41
government may protect that privacy. Rowan v. Post Office Department
involved a federal statute which allowed an individual to halt offensive
mailings to the home. The Rowan Court remarked, "it seems to us that

35. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to obtain an
abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (unmarried woman's right to
use contraceptives); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to view pornography in the home); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry is
a basic civil right).
Assuming that the Court recognized a privacy right in this context, it would
be difficult to show state action where the resident's privacy interest has been
invaded by other private citizens and where the state's only involvement is a failure
to enforce that privacy interest. For a discussion of state action and the constitutional
right to privacy see Comment, Picketers at the Doorstep, 104 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 95, 110 (1974).
Even if such a constitutional right to privacy were established and the necessary
state action were found, the outcome would still be in doubt. Any constitutional
right to privacy might well be subordinated to first amendment expression. In Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), the Court declared that "[p]ublic issue picketing,
'an exercise of ... basic constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic
form,' has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values ...

."

Id. at 466-67.

36. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949).
37. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2502 (1988) (quoting Carey, 447 U.S.
at 471).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).
41. Id.
42. Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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a mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive
addressee. '43 In Kovacs v. Cooper,44 the Court in upholding a city ordinance
prohibiting the use of sounds trucks which emitted "loud and raucous
noises, " 45 described the resident as "helpless to escape this interference
with his privacy."4' FCC v. Pacifica Foundation47 upheld FCC regulations
prohibiting offensive radio broadcasts. 4 The privacy interest in the home
is clearly settled as a significant state interest and one historically capable
49
of resisting intrusion under the guise of expression.
THE FRISBY CouRT's FrST AMENDMENT ANALYsIS
The Frisby Court began its constitutional analysis by asserting that the
city's anti-picketing ordinance "operates at the core of the First Amendment
by prohibiting appellees from engaging in picketing on an issue of public

concern." 5 While "careful scrutiny" is the standard traditionally applied
to public issue picketing, the Frisby Court looked to the place of the
picketing to establish what restrictions it would permit. 5'
The relevant fora in Frisby were the streets of Brookfield, Wisconsin.
Despite the residential character of the streets, the Frisby Court found
them to be traditional public fora: "A public street does not lose its status
as a traditional public forum simply because it runs through a residential
neighborhood .... The residential character of those streets may well inform

the application of the relevant test, but it does not lead to a different
test." 52 The anti-picketing ordinance was to be measured against the stringent
standards for limiting restrictions on speech in a traditional public forum.53
In keeping with its decision in Perry Education Association v. Perry
Local Educators' Association, 4 the Frisby Court first sought to determine

43. Id. at 736-37.
44. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
45. Id. at 78.
46. Id.at 87.
47. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
48. Id. at 748-49.
49. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2503 (1988).
50. Id. at 2499.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2500. See also Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). The Hague
court declared:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public
places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens.

Id. at 515.
53. Frisby, 108 S. Ct. at 2500.
54. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/13
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whether the ordinance was content-neutral. Appellees argued that the ordinance, while neutral on its face, contained an implied exception for labor
picketing. While a state law55 expressly protecting peaceful labor picketing
supported the contention, the Court declined to accept it.56 The Court
observed that the district court had rejected this interpretation and the
court of appeals had affirmed that rejection.57 Following its usual practice,
the Frisby Court deferred to the lower federal court's construction of the
state statute recounting its "belief that district courts and courts of appeal
are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their respective
states." 8 Having accepted the trial court's statement that the ordinance
was content-neutral,5 9 the Court applied the applicable test as set out in
Perry"
Perry held that a state may enforce "time, place, and manner of

expression" regulations which are content-neutral if those regulations "are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open
ample alternative channels of communication." 6 Frisby found the significant
government interest within the language of the ordinance itself: "the protection of residential privacy. ' 62 In so doing (as noted above), the Court
focused on the uniqueness of the home as a sanctuary of last resort and
63
Brookfield's goal of protecting this sanctuary.
The examination then turned to whether the ordinance was narrowly
tailored to serve the government interest. The test for such tailoring is
whether the ordinance "targets and eliminates no more than the exact
source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy."64 If not narrowly tailored, the
statute is overbroad and must be struck as invalid on its face. 65 Broadrick
v. Oklahoma" described the overbreadth doctrine as "strong medicine"
and held that a finding of facial overbreadth is inappropriate whenever a

Wis. STAT. § 103.53(1) (1986).
56. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2500-01 (1988).
57. Id. at 2501.
58. Id. at 2500 (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,
499-500 (1985)).
59. While the FrisbyCourt noted that the district court had rejected appellee's
interpretation of the state law, id., the trial court did not actually address the
construction of the statute. The finding of content-neutrality was based upon the
trial court's reading of the ordinance's legislative history. Further, the finding of
content-neutrality was unessential to the court's opinion and therefore dicta. Schultz,
619 F. Supp. at 796-97.
60. Id.at 2501.
61. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
62. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2502 (1988).
63. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
64. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. at 2502.
65. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
66. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
55.
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"limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged
statute." 67
Broadrick also limited the application of the overbreadth doctrine in
situations involving speech plus conduct. Where conduct, and not pure
speech is involved, the overbreadth must not only be real but must go
substantially beyond the sweep of the statute's permissible scope. 6 Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville 9 emphasized the need for caution when appraising
a facial challenge because invalidation of an ordinance '70may be an "unnecessary interference with a state regulatory program.
Overbreadth need not necessarily be invoked, however, even where
certain speech has been totally prohibited. A complete ban could be narrowly
tailored as long as every act within the statute's scope is part of the
"targeted evil." ' 7' For example, Frisby cited City Council of Los Angeles
v. Taxpayersfor Vincent,72 in which the Court upheld an ordinance banning
all signs on public property because the evil to be targeted was the "visual
clutter and blight" which the signs created. Each sign was a part of that
clutter and therefore appropriately restricted by a total ban. 73 The Frisby
Court applied this same principle, except that the Court viewed the ordinance
as a total ban on "focused" picketing, rather than residential picketing in
general. 74 It characterized the picketing which the ordinance prohibited as
directed at a home rather than toward the public: a message intended as
an offensive intrusion upon a particular resident. 7s As such, the Court
76
viewed every instance of focused picketing as a part of the targeted evil.
In so holding, the Supreme Court in Frisby disagreed with the lower
courts which had read the ordinance as a complete ban on picketing in
a residential neighborhood.7 7 The district court had, in effect, applied the
overbreadth doctrine when it found the ordinance "likely to fail the test
of a constitutional time, place, and manner regulation of speech." 78 Ad-

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 613.
Id. at 616.
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1973).
Id. at 216. See'Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 499-

500 (1985) (while normally the lower federal courts are better situated to construe
the laws in their states, "we surely have authority to differ with the lower federal

courts as to the meaning of a state statute."). See also Virginia v. American
Booksellers Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. 636 (1988).
71. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2502-03 (1988).
72. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984).
73. Id. at 808-10.
74. Frisby, 108 S.Ct. at 2503-04.
75. Id.at 2503.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2503-04.
78. Schultz v. Frisby, 619 F. Supp. 792, 797-98 (E.D. Wis. 1985), aff'd,
807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated, 818 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd en
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/13
banc, 822 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S.Ct. 2495 (1988).
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dressing its refusal to defer to the lower court's construction of the ordinance, the Supreme Court said, "[w]e are particularly reluctant to defer
when the lower courts have fallen into plain error ... which is precisely
the situation here." '79 The error consisted in reading the language "unlawful
... to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of
any individual" 80 as a ban on all picketing in a residential area. The Frisby
Court instead proclaimed a narrow reading of the ordinance in keeping
with a "well established principle that statutes will be interpreted to avoid
constitutional difficulties.""' The Frisby Court reasoned that the use of
the singular words "residence" and "dwelling" suggested a ban only of
picketing which was "focused" upon a particular residence.12 The Court
was further persuaded by Brookfield's Counsel's representations that the
town viewed the ordinance as only prohibiting focused picketing.83 The
ordinance's reach, as the Frisby Court ultimately construed it, was that it
'84
banned "picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence."
This limiting construction aided the Court in two areas. First, it allowed
the Court to find the ordinance "narrowly tailored." 85 The ordinance would
prohibit only focused, targeted picketing; i.e., only the evil which it might
legitimately prevent.8 6 Second, this narrow construction permitted the Court
to find that the ordinance "preserves ample alternative channels of communication." 8 7 The Court indicated that the ordinance would not prohibit
numerous other forms of expression such as "[gleneral marching through
residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire
block of houses ... ."88 It would not prohibit the distribution of literature,
door-to-door or by the mails. 89 Contacts by telephone would be permissible,

79. Frisby, 108 S. Ct. at 2501.
80. Id. at 2498, 2501.
81. Id. at 2501.
82. Id.
83. Id. In his concurrence Justice White accepted the representations of
counsel as sufficient to avoid application of the overbreadth doctrine, but expressed
reservations in relying on those statements. He pointed out that only in the oral
argument did the town's counsel restrict the scope of the ordinance's enforcement.
The appellant's briefs claimed that the ordinance banned all picketing in a residential
area. Further, counsel had not argued this restricted construction in the courts
below. Id. at 2505.
According to Walter M. Weber, attorney for the appellees, the Town of
Brookfield has subsequently enforced the ordinance against seven demonstrators
(including one of the original plaintiffs) who marched up and down the street and
around the block. He said that notwithstanding the town counsel's assurances to
the Supreme Court, the town had never intended to abide by the narrower interpretation (telephone interview with Walter M. Weber, January 12, 1988).
84. Id. at 2501.
85. Id. at 2504.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2501-02.
88. Id. at 2501.
Id. at of
2501
(citation
Published89.
by University
Missouri
Schoolomitted).
of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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short of harassment. 90 The ordinance, having been found content-neutral,
narrowly tailored to meet only the significant government interest, and
preserving of alternative channels of communication, was accordingly upheld

and the facial challenge to its constitutionality failed.9'
DISSENT: Tim COSTS OF FRISBY

The dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall criticized the majority
for approving an ordinance which prohibits more speech than required to
protect the legitimate state interest. "[T]his test requires that the government
demonstrate that the offending aspects of the prohibited manner of speech
cannot be separate[d], and less intrusively, controlled." 92 It pointed out
that the government could constitutionally regulate the most troublesome
aspects of picketing: shouting, trespassing, blocking exits. 93 The government
might regulate the number of picketers, the hours of picketing or the noise
94
level so that the intrusiveness of the picket is controlled.
The dissent also rejected the argument that picketers wish to communicate only with the "targeted resident." 9 The speech in this case was
directed at both the doctor and the public; even the site itself serves to
identify the object of the protest. 96 Finally, the dissent objected to the
majority's depiction of even a lone picketer as a sinister presence; a "lurking
stranger. ' 97 The solitary picketer, at midafternoon, is not objectionable
because the picketer lurks surreptitiously but because she is open and
notorious. 98 If picketing were regulated so as to be non-coercive and nonintrusive, then the only remaining discomfort to the resident would be that
of "knowing there is a person outside who disagrees with someone inside." 99
Justice Stevens, whose comment began this Note, criticized the majority
for finding the ordinance "narrowly tailored" to protect "only unwilling
1 He wrote that the ordinance's
recipients of the communications." W
plain
language prohibited all picketing without regard to its intrusiveness: the
same prohibitions applied whether the picketing was directed at willing,
indifferent or unwilling recipients.' 0' He also emphasized that speech may

90.
91.

Id. at 2501-02.

Id. at 2504.

92. Id. at 2507 (Brennan J., dissenting).
93.

Id.

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 2508.
Id.
Id.

98.

Id.

99. Id.
100. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2509 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting the majority opinion).
101.

Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/13
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be offensive in one of two ways. It may give offense independently of its
message, simply by being inappropriately loud or ugly. 10 2 Justice Stevens
did not believe such speech is constitutionally protected. 0 3 At the opposite
pole, however, speech may be offensive solely because the listener disagrees
with the message, however gently delivered. 104 Justice Stevens agreed with
the majority that the overbreadth of the ordinance, while unquestionably
real, may or may not be substantial. It is unlikely that town will enforce
the ordinance in the event that friendly message carriers gather. Perhaps
the town might tolerate even unfriendly pickets briefly. 10 5 Nonetheless the
ordinance gives the town too much latitude, "while potential picketers must
act at their peril ....

It is a simple matter for the town to amend its

ordinance and to limit the ban to conduct that unreasonably interferes
with the privacy of the home and does not serve a reasonable communicative
purpose."06
THE EFFECT OF FRISBY V. SCHULTZ

The Supreme Court in Frisby v. Schultz makes it clear that the government may enforce content-neutral restrictions prohibiting picketers (in
groups or even a single individual) from gathering in front of a residence
and "focusing" their protest upon the occupants of that residence. °7 By
contrast, the Court indicated that "walking a route in front of an entire

block of houses" would be protected. 108 The Court construed the challenged

ordinance, however, to prohibit only "focused" picketing which occurred
"solely"

in front of a particular residence.

1°9

The Frisby Court specifically

left undecided situations involving picketing of a home used as a business

or meeting place or where the resident invites picketers." 0
Regarding picketing of a residence used as a business, the Supreme
Court case of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5"' was

the first to suggest the link between the right to picket and freedom of
speech. Senn upheld a state law authorizing peaceful picketing. 12 Apparently
the Court considered the fact that Senn's home was also a workplace
unimportant."'

102. Id. (citation omitted).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
require a
113.

Id.
Id. at 2508.
Id. at 2510.
Id.
Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2501 (1988).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2504.
301 U.S. 468 (1937).
Ironically, this is the same law that the appellees' in Frisby argued would
labor picketing exception to the Brookfield ordinance.
301 U.S. at 473-75.
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In the 1980 case of Carey v. Brown," 4 the Court dealt with an Illinois
statute"15 which banned the picketing of residences or private dwellings,
but exempted from the ban "the peaceful picketing of a place of employment
involved in a labor dispute. ' " 6 The Court struck the statute on equal
protection grounds, holding that the state may protect "individual privacy
by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regulations applicable to
7
all speech irrespective of content. '
The difference between regulation of the place of expression and restrictions based on content, while not necessarily important in practice, is
certainly important from a constitutional standpoint." 8 The statute in Carey
was subsequently amended to remove the offending language but still
contained an exception for the picketing of a residence used as a business
or place of meeting for the discussion of public issues." 9 Such an exception
respects the Court's holding in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 20 which
involved protesters outside a high school. The Grayned Court stated: "The
nature of a place, [and] 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.' ...
The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time."'' This standard, which looks to the appropriateness of the location,
would seemingly leave some room for the type of "focused" picketing
found in Frisby in those situations where the residence is the relevant and
fitting location for such protest. The home may be most appropriate where
no alternative location for expression exists. The Frisby Court, however,
did not mention and did not appear to be affected by the obvious alternative
that the doctor could have been picketed at his place of business,'2 nor

114. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
115. ILL. Riv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 21.1-2 (1977).

116. Additionally, the statute made exceptions for picketing a residence or
dwelling used either as a business or as a meeting place "commonly used to discuss
subjects of general public interest." Id.
117. Carey, 447 U.S. at 470.
118. The distinction often might be of no practical effect. The result of

allowing an exception for the picketing of a place of business would be no different
than if the exception were for picketing related to the conduct of that business.
Few individuals would have any other reason to picket the location in any event.
The same practical effect also occurs when analyzing restrictions rather than ex-

ceptions to restrictions. If a city were to enact place regulations that effectively

limited the picketing of an abortion clinic, the result would be the same as if it
had enacted content-specific regulations. No one would be restrained except antiabortion protesters because it is unlikely that anyone else would wish to picket
there anyway.
119. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 21.1-2 (1987).
120. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
121. Id. at 116.
122. Schultz v. Frisby, 619 F. Supp. 792, 795 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/13
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is there any indication regarding the outcome had that option not been
available. ,23
Further Carey v. Brown' was potentially an important precedent in
that it involved the picketing of a public official's residence. 25 In Carey,
the Supreme Court gave no indication that merely because the resident
was the mayor of Chicago his home should be placed into any category
other than that of a residence used solely for residential purposes. 26 Presumably, city hall would be available for picketing, thus leaving no basis
for classifying the mayor's home any differently from those of his neighbors. 27
Aside from the Frisby Court's balancing of the competing interests of
privacy and expression, the Court's treatment of the overbreadth issue gives
rise to another question. The ordinance, while challenged as facially ov28
was not assailed as vague. Yet before the Supreme Court's
erbroad,1
of
Frisby, every party and court read Brookfield's ordinance as
treatment
prohibiting allpicketing in residentialareas.129 Nonetheless, the Frisby Court
found the ordinance susceptible to a narrowing interpretation so as to
respect the policy of avoiding constitutional difficulties wherever possible. 3'
The vagueness issue surfaces because it seems unlikely that anyone who
was to merely read the ordinance would similarly interpret it.'3' The language: "it is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or
about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the town of Brookfield,"' 32 while not vague before the Frisby Court reconstructed it, may
well be vague now that the Court has interpreted it. The Court enhanced
the meaning of the ordinance in a way which many lawyers, not to mention
ordinary people, might never understand.
A vague law is not unconstitutional only because it is a snare for the
innocent or subject to arbitrary enforcement. 33 It may also offend wherever

123. In his dissent to Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), Justice Rehnquist
disparaged the Court's foggy directions to legislatures attempting to formulate
reasonable picketing statutes. He lamented that the Court's "hymns of praise in
prior opinions celebrating carefully drawn statutes are no more than sympathetic
clucking, and in fact the State is damned if it does and damned if it doesn't."
Id. at 475-76.
124. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
125. Id. at 457.
126. Id. at 477 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2497 (1988).
129. Id. at 2505 (White, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 2501.
131. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). The Court in Grayned
held that "[i]t is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined .... [W]e insist that laws give
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." Id. at 108.
132. Frisby, 108 S. Ct. at 2498.
104, 108-09
Rockford,
408 U.S.Repository,
Graynedofv.Missouri
City of
133.by University
Published
School
of Law Scholarship
1989 (1972).
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it tends to inhibit the exercise of first amendment freedoms. 34 Whenever
citizens subject to such a law wish to exercise their freedom of expression
through picketing, they steer a course between getting arrested on one hand
and foregoing the exercise of constitutional rights on the other.
The Supreme Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford,' held: "Uncertain
meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone'
...than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."' 36
Unless citizens are aware of the Frisby Court's narrow interpretation of
the ordinance, those wishing to avoid arrest will be encouraged to forego
the exercise of their rights. Laws such as the Brookfield ordinance may
cause potential picketers to steer so wide and clear in exercising their first
amendment freedoms so as to devalue the Frisby Court's narrow construction of the ordinance and its attempt to avoid conflict with local lawmakers.
In defense of the majority opinion in Frisby v. Schultz, however, the
narrowing interpretation of the ordinance was not necessarily adverse to
the interests of the picketers in question. Their activities allegedly fell within
the area which the city might have constitutionally prohibited.'37 Also, while
the statute as interpreted requires clarification for the ordinary person to
understand it, the need to interpret statutes is a common feature of our
legal system. Nor is it especially notable that a court interpreted an ordinance
differently from its most common meaning. The narrowed interpretation
presents no special danger that the unwary citizen will accidently cross into
the forbidden zone.
Although the dangers of vagueness are most obvious where an individual
is innocently entangled in the violation of a vague law, he at least retains
substantive defenses to prosecution. If the violated law is shown to be
vague, the courts will not enforce it.138
The Brookfield ordinance, however, presents a completely different
problem. The ordinance appears to prohibit all picketing in residential
neighborhoods. 3 9 An ordinary person -or that person's attorney-would
probably understand it in its plain sense. Lacking the urgent situation where

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 109.
408 U.S. 104 (1972).
Id. at 109.
Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2498 (1988). In fact, the record

indicates that the one picket that induced neighbors to complain followed an extended
route in front of a number of different residences. See Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition
to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 4 (citing record material),
Schultz v. Frisby, No. 85-C-1018 (E.D. Wisc. Dec. 13, 1988), appealpending, No.

89-1098 (7th Cir. docketed Jan. 17, 1989).
138. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)
(municipal vagrancy ordinance held void for vagueness because it failed "to give
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden.... ).

139. Frisby, 108 S.Ct. at 2501.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/13
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an individual stands accused of violating the law, it is far less likely that
he (or his attorney) would go to the lengths necessary to learn that the
statute did not prohibit all such picketing. Most likely, the ordinary person
would simply forego his constitutional rights. The question is whether the
effective loss of those rights is an acceptable price to pay to avoid interfering
with the legislative province of local government. More to the point: How
much restraint has the court actually shown in leaving the law on the
books? Once the Court purported to change the meaning of the ordinance's
words, the amendment of the words themselves would seem a lesser interference than the interference already imposed. As Justice Stevens concluded in his dissent, "it is a simple matter for the town to amend its
ordinance and to limit the ban ...

."40 Notwithstanding

the Court's proper

reluctance to invoke the overbreadth doctrine, overall fairness and clarity
would be better served if Brookfield amended the ordinance to say what
141
the Supreme Court has decided it now means.
RANDALL M. ENGLAND

140. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2510 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Since the United States Supreme Court is not the ultimate authority in
construing state law, it is possible that the Wisconsin Supreme Court may yet
decide that the ordinance does mean what it says.
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